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1. Overview   
 
The year 2006 evidenced several important judgments and decisions on substantive 
and procedure aspects handed down by the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). This article is not meant to be a comprehensive overview or exhaustive 
compilation of all judgments and decisions issued by international criminal courts in 
the last few months.TPF1FPT Instead, it spotlights and briefly comments on some recent 
developments at the international criminal tribunals with regard to substantive and 
procedural law. 
 
 
2. Elements of Crimes  
 
2.1. The Crime of Terror against the Civilian Population  
 
The ‘crime of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror among the civilian population’ (the crime of terror against the civilian 
population) was first defined by Trial Chamber I of the ICTY in the Galić case.TPF2F PT 
While such a crime is not explicitly mentioned in the ICTY Statute, the Trial 
Chamber found that acts terrorising the civilian population qualified, inter alia, as a 
crime of terror as set forth in Article 51(2) of the first Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and were, accordingly, punishable under Article 3 of the 
ICTY Statute.TPF3FPT On 30 November 2006, the Appeals Chamber endorsed this finding.TPF4FPT 
 
2.1.1 Prohibition on Terror against the Civilian Population in the Additional Protocols 
declaratory of Customary International Law  
 
In his appeal, Galić argued that the Yugoslavia Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the 
‘crime of terror against civilian population’ because “there exists no international 
crime of terror.”TPF5FPT He also contended that “there is no such … criminal offence in 
                                                 
TP
1
PT The present article digests the most significant developments at the International Criminal Tribunals 
from 30 June through 12 December 2006. 
TP
2
PT Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Judgment, 5 December 2003 (Galić Trial 
Judgment) paras 133, 138. Based on the prohibition enshrined in Article 51(2) of the first Additional 
Protocol, the Galić Trial Chamber defined the objective and subjective elements of the offence of 
“terror against civilian population” as follows: “(i) acts of violence [conduct element] directed against 
the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities [circumstance element] 
causing death or serious injury to body or health within the civilian population [result element]; (ii) the 
offender wilfully made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities 
the object of those acts of violence [mens rea]; (iii) the above offence was committed with the primary 
purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population [mens rea].” The Trial Chamber further 
found that the actual infliction of terror is not a constitutive legal element of the crime of terror. 
TP
3
PT Article 13(2) of the Second Additional Protocol is identical to Article 51(2) of the first Additional 
Protocol.  
TP
4
PT Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment, 30 November 2006, (Galić 
Appeal Judgment). 
TP
5
PT Galić Appeal Judgment, para. 79, referring to the Defence Notice of Appeal, para. 25.   
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customary law”, that “this alleged offence was never criminalized”, and “such an 
alleged offence could not be based on treaty law.”TPF6FPT  
The Appeals Chamber rejected the Appellant’s arguments asserting that “while 
binding conventional law that prohibits conduct and provides for individual criminal 
responsibility could provide the basis for the International Tribunal’s jurisdiction, in 
practice the International Tribunal always ascertains that the treaty provision in 
question is also declaratory of custom.” TPF7FPT The Appeals Chamber found that the 
prohibition on terror against the civilian population in the Additional Protocols was 
declaratory of customary international law.TPF8FPT  
The Appeals Chamber further noted that pursuant to Article 1 of the ICTY Statute, 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over ‘serious violations of international humanitarian 
law”, however, it had difficulties in clarifying what is encompassed by the term 
‘international humanitarian law’. In clarifying what is encompassed by the term 
‘international humanitarian law’, the Appeals Chamber relied on the Report of the 
Secretary-General recommending the establishment of the ICTY, in which he 
explained that humanitarian law is comprised of both conventional law and customary 
international law: “This body of law exists in the form of both conventional law and 
customary law. While there is international customary law which is not laid down in 
conventions, some of the major conventional humanitarian law has become part of 
customary international law.” TPF9FPT  
 
2.1.2. Clarification of Actus Reus and Mens rea   
 
As far as the actus reus is concerned, the Galić Appeals Chamber found that the 
‘crime of terror against the civilian population’ can comprise “attacks or threats of 
attacks against the civilian population.”TPF10FPT In so doing, the Appeals Chamber has 
widened the definition given to this crime by the Trial Chamber by including threats 
of violence or acts of violence not causing death or injury. The Appeals Chamber 
provides further clarification as to the objective elements of this offence:  
“The acts or threats of violence constitutive of the crime of terror shall not 
however be limited to direct attacks against civilians or threats thereof but may 
include indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks or threats thereof. The nature of the 
acts or threats of violence directed against the civilian can vary; … Further, the crime 
of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population is not a case in which an explosive device was planted outside 
of an ongoing military attack but rather a case of ‘extensive trauma and psychological 
damage’ being caused by ‘attacks [which] were designed to keep the inhabitants in a 
constant state of terror.’ Such extensive trauma and psychological damage form part 
of the acts or threats of violence.”TPF11FPT 
 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber that the actual 
infliction of terror is not a constitutive legal element of the crime.TPF12FPT  
                                                 
TP
6
PT Ibid. 
TP
7
PT Ibid., para. 85.  
TP
8
PT Ibid., para. 98. The Appeals Chamber further relied on (1) its inclusion in the second sentences of 
both Article 51(2) of the Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II; Article 122 
of the 1923 Hague Rules on Warfare; Article 33 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. See para. 88 
of Galić Appeal Judgment.   
TP
9
PT Report of the Secretary-General (ICTY), para. 33, quoted in Galić Appeal Judgment, para. 81.  
TP
10
PT Galić Appeal Judgment, para. 102 (emphasis added).   
TP
11
PT TGalić Appeal Judgment, para. 102.T 
TP
12
PT TGalić Appeal Judgment, paras 103-104; Galić Trial Judgment, para. 134.T 
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According to the Appeals Chamber, the mens rea requisite of the crime of terror is 
the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population.TPF13FPT Thus, this crime 
falls into the category of specific intent or primary purpose crimes. With regard to 
such category of crimes, the Prosecution must demonstrate that the perpetrator’s 
primary purpose or his conscious objective was to spread terror among civilians. 
Accordingly, dolus eventualis or advertent recklessness is not sufficient to trigger 
criminal responsibility for this offence.TPF14FPT  
 
2.2. Rape - Absence of Consent as an Element of the Crime or as an Affirmative 
Defence?  
 
In the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement,TPF15FPT the Appeals Chamber clarified the law 
relating to rape as a crime against humanity or as an act of genocide. The Prosecution 
had argued that non-consent of the victim and the perpetrator’s knowledge thereof 
should not be considered as constitutive elements of the offence that must be proved 
by the Prosecution.TPF16FPT According to the Prosecution, the crime of rape should be 
viewed in the same way as other violations of international criminal law, such as 
torture or enslavement, for which absence of consent is not an essential element of the 
offence.TPF17FPT Subject to the limitation of Rule 96 of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, the Prosecution contended that consent should be considered an affirmative 
defence.TPF18FPT  
The Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber agreed with the Prosecution that the matter 
should be considered as one of “general significance for the Tribunal’s 
jurisprudence”.TPF19FPT Based on the definition given to the crime of rape by the Kunarac 
Appeals Chamber,TPF20FPT the Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber found that (1) non-consent and 
(2) knowledge thereof are constitutive elements of rape as a crime against humanity, 
and that the Prosecution bears the burden of proving these elements. TPF21FPT  
As for the Prosecution’s argument that consent should be considered an affirmative 
defence based on the provision provided for in Rule 96, the Appeals Chamber drew  
attention to the fact that “[t]he Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not, however, 
redefine the elements of the crimes over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction, which 
are defined by the Statute and by international law.”TPF22FPT According to the Appeals 
Chamber, Rule 96 must be read simply to define circumstances under which evidence 
                                                 
TP
13
PT TGalić Appeal Judgment, paras 102, 104.T 
TP
14
PT See Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Drawing the Boundaries of Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 6 International Criminal Law Review 
(2006) 313, 317-328.    
TP
15
PT Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, 7 July 2006, 
(Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment).  
TP
16
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 147, quoting the Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 155,156. 
TP
17
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 149, quoting the Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 159, 182. 
TP
18
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 147, quoting the Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 160. 
TP
19
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 150 (footnotes omitted). 
TP
20
PT See Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 12 June 
2002 (Kunarac Appeal Judgment) para. 127. 
TP
21
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, paras 151-153. 
TP
22
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 154, quoting Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A-
R77, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, 31 January 2000, 
para. 25, fn. 26.  
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of consent will be admissible, rather than changing the definition of the crime by 
turning an element into a defence.TPF23FPT  
The Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber endorsed the Kunarac Trial Chamber’s analysis 
of Rule 96 vis-à-vis the element of consent in the crime of rape: 
“The reference in the Rule [96] to consent as a “defence” is not entirely consistent 
with traditional legal understandings of the concept of consent in rape. Where consent 
is an aspect of the definition of rape in national jurisdictions, it is generally 
understood […] to be absence of consent which is an element of the crime. The use of 
the word “defence”, which in its technical sense carries an implication of the shifting 
of the burden of proof to the accused, is inconsistent with this understanding. The 
Trial Chamber does not understand the reference to consent as a “defence” in Rule 96 
to have been used in this technical way.” TPF24FPT      
 
2.3 Crimes against Humanity – Neither the Existence of a Policy or Plan nor 
Tolerance by the State is an Ingredient Element  
 
In Gacumbitsi, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Appellant’s submission that “[t]he 
mental element [of crimes against humanity] must be proved by the existence of a 
widespread practice, which implies planning and tolerance of such act by the State.”TPF25FPT  
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that neither proof of a plan or policy nor tolerance 
of such act by the state is a prerequisite to a conviction for crimes against humanity, 
though they can be evidentially relevant.TPF26FPT   
 
 
3. Individual Criminal Responsibility  
 
3.1 Instigation  
 
In the words of the ad hoc Tribunals, “instigating” means prompting another to 
commit an offence.TPF27FPT It requires some kind of influence over the principal offender by 
way of inciting, soliciting, or otherwise inducing him to commit the offence at issue. TPF28FPT 
In the Orić judgment, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY realized that the meaning and 
contents of the constituent elements of instigation are “partly described in different 
terms” under the case law of the ICTY and ICTR.TPF29FPT The Trial Chamber devoted 
special attention to the nature of the actus reus, the causal relationship between the 
instigation and the crime committed, and the mens rea required for this mode of 
criminal participation.  
 
3.1.1. No Instigation of an ‘Omnimodo Facturus’  
 
                                                 
TP
23
PT Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, para. 154, endorsing the view adopted by the Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001 
(Kunarac Trial Judgment) para. 464. 
TP
24
PT Gacumbitsi Appeals Judgment, para. 154. 
TP
25
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 84, quoting the Defence Appeal Brief, para. 314.    
TP
26
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 84.  
TP
27
PT Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006, (Orić Trial 
Judgment) para. 270, referring to several judgments of the ICTY and ICTR (appeal pending).  
TP
28
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 271. 
TP
29
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 269. 
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According to the Orić Trial Chamber, it is not necessarily that the original idea or 
plan to commit the crime was produced by the instigator: “Even if the principal 
perpetrator was already pondering on committing a crime, the final determination to 
do so can still be brought about by persuasion or strong encouragement of the 
instigator. However, if the principal perpetrator is an ‘omnimodo facturus’ meaning 
that he has definitely decided to commit the crime, further encouragement or moral 
support may merely, though still, qualify as aiding and abetting.”TPF30FPT 
Unlike ‘ordering’ as a form of participation under Article 7(1) of the ICTY’s 
Statute, the Chamber held that instigation “does not presuppose any kind of 
superiority” between the instigator and the principal perpetrator.TPF31FPT The Orić Trial 
Chamber ruled that “instigation influence can be generated both face to face and by 
intermediaries as well as exerted over a smaller or larger audience, provided that the 
instigator has the corresponding mens rea.”TPF32FPT  
 
3.1.2. No condicio sine qua non 
 
Although a nexus between instigation and the actual commission of the crime is 
required, it is not to be understood as requiring proof that, in terms of a condicio sine 
qua non, the crime in question would not have occurred without the instigator’s 
involvement.TPF33FPT In Orić, the Trial Chamber followed neither the Prosecution theory – 
the conduct of the Accused was a “clear and contributing factor of the commission of 
the crime” – nor the Defence’s submission – the conduct of the Accused must have 
had a “direct and substantial effect” on the perpetration of the crime.TPF34FPT As for the 
Prosecution’s contention, the Chamber drew attention to the fact that “not any 
contributing factor can suffice for instigation, as it must be a substantial one”.TPF35FPT As 
for the Defence submission, it held that instigation “needs not necessarily have direct 
effect, as prompting another to commit a crime can also be procured by means of an 
intermediary.” TPF36FPT  
In Gacumbitsi, however, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the Prosecution’s 
contention that in order to trigger criminal responsibility for instigation “it suffices to 
demonstrate that the accused’s instigation ‘substantially contributed’ to the 
commission of the crime – that is, that he ‘set in motion a chain of events that were 
the foreseeable consequence of his instigation of the crime.”TPF37FPT 
 
3.1.3. Mens Rea – Cognitive and Volitional Components  
 
The Orić Trial Chamber’s articulation of the instigator’s mens rea marks a decisive 
step on the way to an ever-clearer recognition that individual criminal responsibility 
for serious crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction requires intention.TPF38FPT The 
                                                 
TP
30
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 271 (footnotes omitted). 
TP
31
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 272. 
TP
32
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 273 (emphasis added), (footnotes omitted). 
TP
33
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 274. 
TP
34
PT Orić Trial Judgment, paras 275-276. 
TP
35
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 276. 
TP
36
PT Ibid., (emphasis added). 
TP
37
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 127, quoting the Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 120-122.  
TP
38
PT See Orić Trial Judgment, para. 279. See also Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 
Appeals Judgment, 29 July 2004 (Blaškić Appeals Judgment) para. 41: “[T]he knowledge of any kind 
of risk, however low, does not suffice for the imposition of criminal responsibility for serious 
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Chamber also agreed with the Defence’s submission that ‘intent’ does not include 
‘recklessness’:TPF39FPT “intention contains (1) a cognitive element of knowledge and (2) a 
volitional element of acceptance and that this intention must be present with respect to 
both the participant’s own conduct and the principal crime he is participating in.”TPF40FPT 
Accordingly, mere knowledge on the part of the accused is not sufficient to trigger the 
criminal liability for principal perpetrators or instigators for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. The Tribunal put it more clearly:  
“…first, with regard to (1) his own conduct, the instigator must be aware [cognitive 
component] of his influencing effect on the principal perpetrator to commit the crime, 
as well as the instigator, even if neither aiming at nor wishing so, must at least accept 
[volitional component] that the crime be committed. Second, with regard to (2) the 
principal perpetrator, the instigator must be both aware of, and agree to, the 
intentional completion of the principal crime. Third, with regard to the (3) volitional 
element of intent, the instigator, when aware that the commission of the crime will 
more likely than not result from his conduct, may be regarded as accepting its 
occurrence. Although the latter does not require the instigator precisely to foresee by 
whom and under which circumstances the principal crime will be committed nor that 
it would exclude indirect inducement, the instigator must at least be aware of the type 
and the essential elements of the crime to be committed.”TPF41FPT 
 
3.2. Joint Criminal Enterprise v. Co-perpetratorship 
 
Although the Statutes of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals do not make explicit 
reference to the theory of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE), the Appeals Chamber of 
these Tribunals held that participating in JCE is a form of liability which exists in 
customary international law, and which is a form of ‘commission’ under Articles 7(1) 
& 6(1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively.TPF42FPT  
In the Stakić Judgment, the Trial Chamber explicitly rejected the application of 
JCE and applied a mode of liability which it termed ‘co-perpetratorship’ which in 
general requires ‘joint functional control over a crime’.TPF43FPT In so doing, the Stakić Trial 
                                                                                                                                            
violations of international humanitarian law [and that, therefore,] an awareness of a higher likelihood 
of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard.” 
TP
39
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 348 fn. 1020.  
TP
40
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 279 (numbers added). 
TP
41
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 279 (numbers added).  
TP
42
PT See Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 February 
2005, para. 79-80, 99; Tadić Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras 188, 195-226; Prosecutor v. Milan 
Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision in Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 2003, para. 20; Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević Case 
No. IT-98-32-A, Appeal Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 111 (“The Appeals Chamber recalls that 
the case-law of the Tribunal stemming from the Tadić Appeals Judgment and the Ojdanić Decision 
regards participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a form of commission”); Prosecutor v. Mitar 
Vasiljevic Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment, 29 November 2002, paras 94-95. For the ICTR see 
Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A/ 96-17-A, 
Appeal Judgment, 13 December 2004, para. 462: (“Given the fact that both the ICTY and ICTR have 
mirror articles identifying the modes of liability by which an individual can incur criminal 
responsibility, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that the jurisprudence of the ICTY should be applied to 
the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute”); See also Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera et 
al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Appeals 
Decision, 12 April 2006 (Karemera Appeals Decision) para. 16.  
TP
43
PT Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003 (Stakić Trial 
Judgment) paras 438. In his Separate Opinion in Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Judge Schomburg 
encapsulated the general features of co-perpetratorship in the following words: “Co-perpetration in 
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Chamber applied a combination of two forms of commission known in German 
criminal law as Mittäterschaft (“co-perpetration”) and mittelbare Täterschaft 
(“indirect perpetratorship”). The main features of co-perpetration is that the “co-
perpetrators must pursue a common goal, either through an explicit agreement or 
silent consent, which they can only achieve by co-ordinated action and joint control 
over the criminal conduct. Each co-perpetrator must make a contribution essential to 
the commission of the crime.”TPF44FPT  
The Stakić Appeals Chamber, however, set aside, proprio motu, the finding that 
the Appellant was responsible as a co-perpetrator and qualified the Appellant’s 
responsibility as participation in a JCE. It held “that the Trial Chamber erred in 
conducting its analysis of the responsibility of the Appellant within the framework of 
“co-perpetratorship”. This mode of liability, as defined and applied by the Trial 
Chamber, does not have support in customary international law or in the settled 
jurisprudence of this Tribunal, which is binding on the Trial Chambers.” TPF45FPT Since then, 
the clash between these two concepts intensified.TPF46FPT  
 
3.2.1. ‘Indirect perpetratorship’ – an effective machinery to hold those who acted 
‘behind the scenes’ as perpetrators 
 
The notion of ‘indirect perpetration’ and its application in modern criminal law 
particularly in cases concerning organized crime, terrorism, white collar crime or 
‘state induced criminality’ was adequately examined and analyzed by Judge 
Schomburg in his Separate Opinion in the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment.TP F47FPT This mode 
of indirect perpetratorship “requires that the indirect perpetrator uses the direct and 
physical perpetrator as a mere ‘instrument’ to achieve his goal, i.e., the commission of 
the crime. In such cases, the indirect perpetrator is criminally responsible because he 
exercises control over the act and the will of the direct and physical perpetrator.”TPF48FPT  
                                                                                                                                            
general requires “joint functional control over a crime”. Co-perpetrators must pursue a common goal, 
either through an explicit agreement or silent consent, which they can only achieve by co-ordinated 
action and shared control over the criminal conduct. Each co-perpetrator must make a contribution 
essential to the commission of the crime.” 
TP
44
PT Stakić Trial Judgment, para. 440.  
TP
45
PT Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006, (Stakić 
Appeal Judgment) para. 62. For critical analysis of the law of joint criminal enterprise in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY see Attila Bogdan, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a 
“Joint Criminal Enterprise” in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006) 63-120 with several references regarding 
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni’s critical opinion on the law of JCE as applied by the International 
Criminal Tribunals.  
TP
46
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen’ pp. 87-95 and the 
‘Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for 
Committing Genocide’ pp. 105-115; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Appeal 
Judgment, 28 November 2006 (Simić Appeal Judgment) ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen’ 
paras 31-32 and the ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg’ paras 9-23, quoting and citing two 
Articles which appeared at this Review, namely, Héctor Olásolo & Ana Pérez Cepeda, ‘The Notion of 
Control of the Crime and its Application by the ICTY in the Stakić Case’, 4 International Criminal Law 
Review (2004) 475-526; Mohamed Elewa Badar, “Just Convict Everyone!” ‘Joint Perpetration: From 
Tadić to Stakić and Back Again’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006) 293-302.  
TP
47
PT See Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras. 18-21, 26. 
Reference being made to the Argentinean National Appeals Court, Judgement on Human Rights 
Violations by the Former Military leaders of 9 December 1985, which was upheld by the Argentinean 
Supreme Court on 30 December 1986. In this case the Argentinean Courts have entered convictions for 
crimes committed by members of the of the Junta regime based on indirect perpetratorship.   
TP
48
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para.18 (footnotes omitted).  
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This is not to say that the concept of indirect perpetratorship is limited to 
situations where the physical perpetrator is an ‘innocent agent’, or has defence such as 
insanity or infancy. In such cases an ‘innocent agent’ is a “mere machine whose 
movements are regulated by the principal.”TPF49FPT Rather, the notion of ‘indirect 
perpetration’ applies “even where the direct and physical perpetrator is criminally 
responsible (“perpetrator behind the perpetrator”).TPF50FPT  
Judge Schomburg noted that ‘the notion of indirect perpetratorship’ suits the needs 
of both international criminal law as national law. He contended that the application 
of indirect perpetratorship in the sphere of international criminal law will significantly 
help “to bridge any potential physical distance from the crime scene of persons who 
must be regarded as main perpetrators because of their overall involvement and 
control over the crimes committed.”TPF51FPT  
In support of this position Judge Schomburg quoted the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
decision in Lubanga case: “In the Chamber view, there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that, given the alleged hierarchical relationship between Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo and the other members of the UPC and FPLC, the concept of indirect 
perpetration which, along with that of co-perpetration based on joint control of the 
crime referred in the Prosecution’s Application, is provided for in article 25(3) of the 
Statute, could be applicable to Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’s alleged role in the 
commission of the crimes set out in the Prosecution’s Application.”TPF52FPT       
He also quoted the relevant passages of the German Federal Supreme Court’s 
ruling in the Politbüro case which illustrates the main feature of the concept of 
indirect perpetration in addition to the objective and subjective elements required: 
“[I]n certain groups of cases, however, even though the direct perpetrator has 
unlimited responsibility for his actions, the contribution by the man behind the scenes 
almost automatically brings about the constituent elements of the offence intended by 
that man behind the scene. Such is the case, for example, when the man behind the 
scenes take advantages of certain basis conditions through certain organisational 
structures, where his contribution to the event sets in the motion regular procedures. 
Such basic conditions with regular procedures are found particularly often among 
organisational structures of the State […] as well as in hierarchies of command. If the 
man behind the scenes acts in full awareness of these circumstances, particularly if he 
exploits the direct perpetrator’s unconditional willingness to bring about the 
constituent elements of the crime, and if he wills the result as that of his own actions, 
then he is perpetrator by indirect perpetration. He has control over the action […]. In 
such cases, failing to treat the man behind the scenes as a perpetrator would not do 
justice to the significance of his contribution to the crime, especially since 
                                                 
TP
49
PT Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd edn., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961) 
349-350.  
TP
50
PT Being aware that the phrase ‘indirect perpetratorship’ may lead to confusion, Judge Schomburg in 
footnote 36 of his Separate Opinion in Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment drew attention to the following: 
“As indirect perpetratorship focuses on the indirect perpetrator’s control over the will of the direct and 
physical perpetrator, it is sometimes understood to require a particular ‘defect’ on the part of the direct 
and physical perpetrator which excludes his criminal responsibility.” 
TP
51
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 21.   
TP
52
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, fn. 39, quoting Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and 
the Incorporation of Document into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-
01/04-01/06, 24 February 2006, Annex I: Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest, Article 58, para. 96 (Judge Schomburg’s emphasis). 
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responsibility often increase rather than decrease the further one is from the scene of 
the crime […].”TPF53FPT 
 
3.2.2. Co-perpetratorship vis-à-vis Customary International Law 
 
In his dissenting opinion in the Simić Appeal Judgment, Judge Schomburg contended 
that co-perpetratorship “is firmly entrenched in customary international law”.TPF54FPT In 
support of this position, Judge Schomburg referred to a recent comparative survey of 
national legal systems conducted by the Max-Planck-Institute in Germany,TPF55FPT which 
illustrates that at least 23 States, including the successor States on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, acknowledge the concept of co-perpetratorship in their criminal 
codes.TPF56FPT According to Judge Schomburg, co-perpetratorship suits the needs of 
international criminal law particularly well and also refers to the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court which includes the notion of co-perpetratorship in 
Article 25(3)(a). He concluded, “[g]iven the ample acknowledgment of co-
perpetratorship, the ICC does not create new law in this respect, but reflects existing 
law at least since the point in time when both ad-hoc Tribunals were vested with 
jurisdiction ratione temporis …”TPF57FPT  
Judge Shahabuddeen, however, had a different opinion: “[T]he required state 
practice and opinio juris do not exist so as to make either theory part of customary 
international law. That opens the risk of there being a non liquet on matter of 
substance in international criminal law as applied by the Tribunal. That risk was 
sensed in Erdemović. There too there was a clash between domestic legal systems. 
The majority in the Appeals Chamber was able to avoid the risk in that case only, on 
one view, by going outside the normal principles of international criminal law. 
Whether the risk in this case can be avoided by taking a less adventurous course is 
best left for future inquiry.”TPF58FPT  
 
 
3.2.3. Harmonization between the Two Concepts? 
 
In the Gacumbitsi and Simić Appeal Judgments, Judge Schomburg noted that the 
notions of JCE and co-perpetratorship “widely overlap and have therefore to be 
                                                 
TP
53
PT German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Judgment of 26 July 1994, BGHSt 40, pp. 218-
240, p. 236, quoted in Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 20. 
Judge Schomburg also referred to Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute which includes both the notion of 
co-perpetration and indirect perpetration.    
TP
54
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, fn. 20.  
TP
55
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, referring to a survey entitled 
“Participation in Crime: Criminal Liability of Leaders of Criminal Groups and Networks , Expert 
Opinion, Commissioned by the United Nations – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor” undertaken by the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and 
International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany.  
TP
56
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, para. 13; See also Gacumbitsi 
Appeal Judgment, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the 
Appellant for Committing Genocide’ para. 22: “It is important to note that neither the law of Rwanda 
nor the law of the former Yugoslavia employs the theory of joint criminal enterprise.” 
TP
57
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, para. 16.   
TP
58
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen’ para. 51 (emphasis in 
original). 
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harmonized in the jurisprudence of both ad hoc Tribunals.” TPF59FPT According to Judge 
Schomburg, such harmonization could provide the three categories of JCE “with 
sharper contours by combining objective and subjective components in an adequate 
way.” TPF60FPT Furthermore, this “harmonization will lead to greater acceptance of the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence by international criminal courts in the future …” TPF61FPT  
Such harmonization was viewed by Judge Shahabuddeen as impracticable. He 
pointed out that “the contribution of an accused to a JCE does not have to be a sine 
qua non of the commission of the crime. … By contrast, under the co-perpetratorship 
theory, since the non fulfilment by a participant of his promised contribution would 
‘ruin’ the accomplishment of the enterprise as visualized, the making of his 
contribution would appear to be a sine qua non. Therefore, though the two theories 
overlap, they arrive at a point of incompatibility touching guilt or innocence: at that 
point one theory is wrong, the other right. This would seem to indicate that only one 
of the two theories can prevail in the same legal system.” TPF62FPT  
 
 
3.3 Command Responsibility  
 
3.3.1 Conduct of the Subordinate - Not limited to physical perpetration 
 
In the Orić judgement, as well as in the Boškoski trial,TPF63FPT Trial Chamber II of the ICTY 
ruled that superior responsibility is not limited to crimes committed physically by the 
subordinates (principal perpetrators) but it encompasses situations where the 
subordinates merely aided and abetted the crime of others (accessories). Adopting a 
broad interpretation of the word ‘committing’ in Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, the 
Orić Trial Chamber held that decisive weight must be given to the purpose of superior 
criminal responsibility as “it aims at obliging commanders to ensure that subordinates 
do not violate international humanitarian law, either by harmful acts or by omitting a 
protective duty. This enforcement of international humanitarian law would be 
impaired to an inconceivable degree if a superior had to prevent subordinates only 
from killing or maltreating in person, while he could look the other way if he 
observed that subordinates ‘merely’ aided and abetted others in procuring the same 
evil.”TPF64FPT 
 
3.3.2. Conduct of the Subordinate - Commission by Omission – Duty to act  
 
In the Orić judgment, Trial Chamber II held that a superior’s criminal responsibility is 
not limited to subordinate’s active perpetration or participation, but also comprises 
their committing by omission.TPF65FPT The following hypothetical example given by the 
Trial Chamber is illustrative: “… if for instance the maltreatment of prisoners by 
guards, and/or by outsiders not prevented from entering the location, is made possible 
                                                 
TP
59
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, para. 17; Gacumbitsi Appeal 
Judgment, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg” para. 22. 
TP
60
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, para. 17. 
TP
61
PT Simić Appeals Judgment, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg”, para. 17. 
TP
62
PT Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, ‘Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen’ para. 50; See also Simić 
Appeal Judgment, ‘Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen’ para. 32.   
TP
63
PT Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion 
to Amend the Indictment, 26 May 2006 (Boškoski Decision), paras 18-48.  
TP
64
PT Orić Trial Judgment, paras 300-301. 
TP
65
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 302. 
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because subordinates in charge of the prison fail to ensure the security of the detainees 
by adequate measures, it does not matter any further by whom else, due to the 
subordinates’ neglect of protection, the protected persons are being injured , nor 
would it be necessary to establish the identity of the direct perpetrators.”TPF66FPT In order to 
support its proposition the Trial Chamber gave the following reasons:  
“(1) this position is supported by the common usage of ‘act’ and ‘committing’ as legal 
umbrella-terms for conduct that consists of actively causing a certain result to occur 
or in failing to prevent its occurrence.TPF67FPT 
(2) since commission through culpable omission is not limited to perpetration but, 
according to the case [law] of this Tribunal, is open to all forms of participation, 
instigating as well as aiding and abetting can also be carried out by omission. TPF68FPT 
(3) with regard to the consequence for the superior’s responsibility, … his or her duty 
to prevent or punish concerns all modes of conduct a subordinate may be criminally 
responsible for under Article 7(1) of the Statute, be it perpetration by committing the 
relevant crime (alone or jointly with others) in person or be it participation, as in form 
of instigation or otherwise aiding and abetting, and further, that any of these modes of 
liability may be performed by positive action or culpable omission.”TPF69FPT 
Finally and most noteworthy, the Tribunal stressed that in what ever mode of 
criminal participation, “omission can incur responsibility only if there was a duty to 
act in terms of preventing the prohibited result from occurring.”TPF70FPT  
 
 
4. Right of the Accused 
 
4.1 Right to Self-representation – Imposition of Counsel – Warning Requirement 
 
The right to self-representation is highly esteemed in proceedings before international 
criminal tribunals. The right of an accused to defend himself in person or through 
legal assistance of his own choosing is enshrined in the Statutes of nearly all 
international and internationalized criminal tribunals.TPF71FPT Imposition of Defence counsel 
against the will of the accused is seen as a severe curtailment of the accused’s 
rights.TPF72FPT International criminal tribunals have therefore been quite reluctant to impose 
(a) permanent counsel (i.e. Slobodan Milošević, during Defence case, Jean Bosco 
Barayagwiza) TPF73FPT and have instead tested compromises like (b) amicus curiae (i.e. 
Slobodan Milošević during Prosecution case), (c) ‘stand-by counsel’ (i.e. Hinga 
                                                 
TP
66
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 305. 
TP
67
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 302 (footnotes omitted).  
TP
68
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 303 (footnotes omitted). 
TP
69
PT Ibid., para. 305 (numbers added). 
TP
70
PT Orić Trial Judgment, para. 304 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). For more details on the 
concept of ‘omission’ in international criminal law see Michael Duttwiller, ‘Liability for Omission in 
International Criminal Law’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006) 1-61. 
TP
71
PT Article 21 (4)(d) ICTY-Statute; Article 20 (4)(d) ICTR-Statute; Article 67 (1)(d) ICC-Statute; Article 
17 (4)(d) SCSL Statue. Most notably, the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, however, does not allow 
self-representation – Saddam Hussein was not allowed to defend himself.  
TP
72
PT See critical analysis by Michael P. Scharf, Self-Representation versus Assignment of Defence 
Counsel before International Tribunals, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006) 12-30. 
TP
73
PT Prosecutor v. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel 
Motion to Withdraw, 2 November 2000; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-
AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence 
Counsel, 1 November 2004 and Case No. IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence 
Counsel, 22 September 2004 (Oral Order of the Trial Chamber, 2 September 2004, T. 32356-32392).  
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Norman, Vojislav Šešelj) or (d) ‘duty counsel’ (i.e. Arsène S. Ntahobali).TPF74FPT Recent 
decisions by the Yugoslavia Tribunal reflect great difficulties regarding the 
imposition of permanent Defence counsel.  
On 27 November 2006, the ICTY Trial Chamber I imposed permanent Defence 
counsel on Vojislav Šešelj, an accused whose declared aim is to ‘bring the Tribunal 
down to its knees’.TPF75FPT This decision is designated “No. 2” as on 21 August 2006, the 
Trial Chamber had for the first time imposed permanent counsel (“first decision”).TPF76FPT 
Before that, a “stand-by counsel” had been assigned, who was designated to assist in 
the preparation and presentation of the case.TPF77FPT The assignment of stand-by counsel, 
however, did not bring about the desired moderation of Mr. Šešelj’s behaviour or the 
focus on legal issues in the numerous submissions filed by Mr. Šešelj.  
In its first decision on imposition of permanent counsel, the Trial Chamber held 
that the behaviour of Mr. Šešelj “provided a strong indication that self-representation 
would substantially and persistently obstruct the proper and expeditious conduct of 
the proceedings”.TPF78FPT This legal test had previously been applied by the Appeals 
Chamber in the case against Slobodan Milošević, albeit with respect only to 
Milošević’s bad health condition.TPF79FPT The Trial Chamber found that the conduct of 
Mr. Šešelj as a whole, his obstructionist and disruptive behaviour, his deliberate 
disrespect for the rules, his intimidation of witnesses and slanderous comments as 
well as his inability or rather unwillingness to defend himself during the pre-trial 
phase indicated that Mr. Šešelj would go on in substantially and persistently 
obstructing the proper and expeditious conduct of the remainder of the trial. It 
concluded that imposition of counsel was justified and ordered that Mr. Šešelj’s 
participation in the proceedings will be through counsel, unless the Trial Chamber 
determines otherwise.TPF80FPT 
The Trial Chamber heard “otherwise” from the Appeals Chamber. On 20 October 
2006, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY reversed the first decision of the Trial 
Chamber on imposition of counsel and restored the right of Mr. Šešelj to represent 
himself in the proceedings against him before the Tribunal.TPF81FPT The Appeals Chamber 
                                                 
TP
74
PT Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsène S. Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision 
on Ntahobali’s Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel, 22 June 2001; Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, 
Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae, 30 August 2001; Prosecutor v. 
Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Order Appointing 
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Šešelj with his Defence, 9 May 2003 (“Šešelj Decision on Assignment of 
Stand-by Counsel”); Prosecutor v. Hinga Norman, Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Consequential Order on Appointment and Role of Standby-Counsel, 14 June 2004. See also discussion 
in Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T, Reasons for Oral Decision Denying Mr. Krajišnik’s 
Request to Proceed Unrepresented by Counsel, 18 August 2005, paras. 22-35.  
TP
75
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Reasons for Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of 
Counsel, 27 November 2006. The Trial Chamber had issued an oral order during the pre-trial 
conference.  
TP
76
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 21 August 
2006 (“Šešelj First Decision on Assignment of Permanent Counsel”). 
TP
77
PT Šešelj Decision on Assignment of Stand-by Counsel.  
TP
78
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 21 August 
2006, paras 73-74 (“Šešelj Second Decision on Assignment of Permanent Counsel”). 
TP
79
PT Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of 
the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, 1 November 2004, para. 13.  
TP
80
PT Šešelj First Decision on Assignment of Permanent Counsel, paras. 27-66, 79.  
TP
81
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision on Assignment of Counsel, 20 October 2006.  
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fully endorsed the legal test applied by the Trial Chamber and confirmed that self-
representation may also be restricted as early as during the pre-trial stage.TPF82FPT  
The Appeals Chamber quashed the first decision of the Trial Chamber on the basis 
that Mr. Šešelj had not been specifically warned that his right to self-representation 
was at risk. It compared the right to self-representation to the right of the accused to 
be present in the courtroom. Since the presence of the accused in the courtroom could 
only be terminated after a warning (Rule 80(B) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence). Such a warning was also required if the right of the accused to represent 
himself was about to be curtailed. The Appeals Chamber held that a general warning 
that persisting with disruptive behaviour could lead to sanctions was insufficient, and 
that a specific warning was required which Mr. Šešelj did not receive.TPF83FPT Interestingly, 
the Appeals Chamber itself then took the opportunity to issue such a specific warning 
to Mr Šešelj, namely via the disposition of the decision.TPF84FPT  
The Trial Chamber’s second decision of 27 November therefore seemed to be the 
last executive step in the imposition of counsel. Mr. Šešelj had continued to 
deliberately disregard decisions by the Trial Chamber and had repeatedly disrupted 
court hearings, most recently by going on a hunger strike and refusing to appear in 
court. After immediate re-imposition of stand-by counsel on 25 October 2006TPF85FPT and 
additional specific warnings,TPF86FPT Trial Chamber I revoked his status as a pro se 
defendant.  
On 8 December 2006, the Appeals Chamber, however, again reversed the decision 
of the Trial Chamber on the ground that it had not, prior to the decision to re-impose 
stand-by counsel, established any persistent or obstructionist behaviour.TPF87FPT Moreover, 
the Appeals Chamber nullified the opening of the proceedings and ordered a restart of 
the trial.TPF88FPT 
The imposition of permanent counsel in the Šešelj case, albeit eventually 
unsuccessful, demonstrates once more that the right to self-representation is not 
absolute and has to be balanced with the interests of justice and fair trial in the 
framework of adversarial proceedings. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR had already 
expressed in the case Prosecutor v. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza that the assigned 
counsel also “represents the interest of the Tribunal to ensure that the Accused 
receives a fair trial and that the aim is to obtain efficient representation and 
adversarial proceedings.TPF89FPT  
 
4.2. Provisional Release – Engagement in Political Activities  
 
                                                 
TP
82
PT Ibid., para. 28. 
TP
83
PT Ibid., paras. 23-25. 
TP
84
PT The Appeals Chamber “hereby explicitly warns Šešelj that, should his self-representation subsequent 
to this Decision substantially obstruct the proper and expeditious proceedings in this case, the Trial 
Chamber will be justified in promptly assigning him counsel after allowing Šešelj the right to be heard 
with respect to his subsequent behaviour.” 
TP
85
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Order Concerning Appointment of Standby 
Counsel and Delayed Commencement of Trial, 25 October 2006. 
TP
86
PT Trial Chamber had warned Šešelj orally during the Status Conference on 8 November and in writing 
in an “Invitation to Accused to Make Submissions”, 22 November 2006.  
TP
87
PT Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against the Trial 
Chamber’s Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel, 8 December 2006, paras 26-27.  
TP
88
PT Ibid., para. 29. 
TP
89
PT Prosecutor v. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel 
Motion to Withdraw, 2 November 2000, para. 21. 
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Decisions granting provisional release of an accused usually impose a number of 
terms and conditions, among them that the accused is not allowed to contact the 
media or discuss his case with anybody. Recent case law witnessed the difficulties the 
ICTY had faced in finding a position as to whether an accused should be permitted to 
engage in political activities during provisional release and as to the conditions under 
which such political activity should be permitted.  
In Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj et al., Trial Chamber II had first ruled that 
Ramush Haradinaj, former Prime Minister of Kosovo and President of the Alliance 
for the Future of Kosovo, would “not be allowed to make any public appearance or in 
any way get involved in any public political activity” for 90 days.TPF90FPT It then re-assessed 
its position and had allowed Haradinaj to appear in public and engage in public 
political activities, but tasked the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (“UNMIK”) to assess whether Haradinaj’s engagement would be “important 
for a positive development of the political and security situation in Kosovo”, and to 
give approval of requests by the Accused regarding each individual activity 
concerned.TPF91FPT The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision by majority, but added to it a 
number of conditions that must be fulfilled for the proper exercise of UNMIK’s 
delegated authority.TPF92FPT  
On 17 October 2006, the approach set forth in these ICTY decisions was put to the 
test.TPF93FPT The UNMIK authorised Haradinaj to give a televised interview to be broadcast 
in Kosovo, but prohibited Haradinaj from making any statements during the 
interview relevant to his case in ICTY and listed subjects on which Haradinaj was 
allowed to provide his views. One day later, the Trial Chamber suspended the 
UNMIK decision upon request of the Prosecution alleging potential for witness 
intimidation and ordered UNMIK, the Prosecution, and Haradinaj to make further 
submissions. TPF94FPT Eventually, after having reviewed the submissions, the Trial Chamber 
denied the Prosecution request to annul the UNMIK decision and lifted the suspension 
in a decision of 27 October 2006.TPF95FPT  
It has been questioned whether the decisions in the Haradinaj case provide a 
legally valid regime for regulating the political activity of provisionally released 
accused. Political activities of a provisionally released accused can be banned or 
restricted in accordance with Rule 65 (B) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, if the Trial Chamber is not convinced that the accused will not pose a 
danger to any victim, witness, or other person. Doubts arise as to what role 
                                                 
TP
90
PT Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on 
Ramush Haradinaj's Motion for Provisional Release, 6 June 2005. 
TP
91
PT Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on 
Defence Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj to Request Re-Assessment of Conditions of 
Provisional Release Granted 6 June 2005”, issued on 12 October 2005, p. 6. 
TP
92
PT Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-AR65.1, Decision 
on Ramush Haradinaj’s Modified Provisional Release”, 10 March 2006. Inter alia, the Appeals 
Chamber ruled that any request from the Accused to UNMIK must also be sent to the Prosecution and 
be made at least 48 hours before the proposed activity. Moreover, any grant of permission by UNMIK 
and UNMIK’s reports to the Trial Chamber must contain a reasoned explanation. 
TP
93
PT UNMIK had, however, already granted authorisation for political activities in 29 out of 40 requests 
by Haradinaj.  
TP
94
PT Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Order 
Suspending UNMIK Decision, 18 October 2006, p. 2. 
TP
95
PT Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Order Lifting 
Suspension on UNMIK Decision, 27 October 2006. It, however, admonished that in future decisions 
authorising public appearances or political activities for Haradinaj, UNMIK shall include in the 
decision the reasoned explanation as required by the Appeals Chamber. 
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organisations like UNMIK could play within this judicial assessment. Judge 
Schomburg and Judge Shahabuddeen dissented from the majority of the Appeals 
Chamber and declared the delegation of authority to the UNMIK under extremely 
broad terms to be ultra vires and they argued that such judicial authority could not be 
delegated to a non-judicial body like the UNMIK. TPF96FPT  
Unlike the delegation of the authority to permit political activity, it appears, 
however, that organisations like UNMIK could be requested to monitor the political 
activities of the accused and report back to the Tribunal so that it could revoke a 
decision allowing political activity of an accused.  
 
5. Primacy/ Complementarity of International and National Tribunals  
 
5.1 Rule 11bis Referrals – Referral of Cases against Persons not fit to Stand Trial  
 
The ICTY has already referred six cases involving nine accused to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and one case involving two accused to Croatia.TPF97FPT On 17 November 
2006, the ICTY for the first time referred a case back to Serbia.TPF98FPT This last referral is 
noteworthy in so far as the mental condition of the accused, who did not even enter a 
plea, was not seen as an obstacle to referral of the case. The Referral Bench held that 
Serbian law disallows the trial of mentally ill persons, but at the same time provided 
for the resumption of the proceedings, once the accused becomes fit to stand trial. In 
addition, the welfare of the accused was ensured.TPF99FPT The ICTR has not yet referred any 
cases to national jurisdictions.  
 
5.2 Rule 11bis Referrals – No Referral to States not Adequately Incriminating 
Genocide  
 
On 30 August 2006, the ICTR Appeals Chamber dismissed the Prosecution’s appeal 
against the Trial Chamber’s decision not to refer the case against Michel Bagaragaza 
to Norway. The Trial Chamber had denied the Prosecution request on the basis that 
Norwegian criminal law had no special genocide provision and that the acts with 
which Bagaragaza is charged in the indictment were only punishable under general 
provisions like homicide.TPF100FPT The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision stating that it 
cannot authorize the referral of a case to a jurisdiction for trial where the conduct 
cannot be charged as a serious violation of international humanitarian law 
(particularly when the accused is charged with genocide). The Appeals Chamber 
expressed its concerns that any acquittal or conviction and sentence would only reflect 
conduct legally characterized as the ‘ordinary crime’ of homicide.  
It is worthwhile to point out that pursuant to Article 9 (2) of the ICTR-Statute, the 
Tribunal may still try a person who has been tried before a national court for acts 
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constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law if the acts for which 
he or she was tried were categorized as an “ordinary crime”. Furthermore, the 
Appeals Chamber held that the protected legal values were different, since the 
penalization of genocide protects specifically defined groups, whereas the 
penalization of homicide protects individual lives.TPF101FPT  
The Appeals Chamber decision should not be interpreted as creating an exclusive 
competency of international criminal tribunals to prosecute and try charges of 
genocide. It sets, however, a higher standard for the legal framework criminalizing the 
accused’s conduct in the State of referral.  
 
6. Procedure 
 
6.1 Enlarged Power of ICTY Chambers to Reduce the Scope of the Indictment   
 
The powers of Trial Chambers of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to reduce the scope of an 
indictment at the pre-trial stage have recently been enlarged. The amended 
Rule 73 bis(D) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (in force since 13 
June 2006) allows Trial Chambers to invite or direct the Prosecutor to select counts in 
the indictment on which to proceed.  
Only recently, ICTY Trial Chambers have made use of this remarkable power, 
although Rule 73 bis in its previous version (amended 17 July 2003) had allowed 
Trial Chambers to “fix the number of crime sites or incidents” in an indictment.  
Prompted by the high number of witnesses and the estimated time for their 
examination-in-chief as well as by a Defence Request, the Chamber in the multi-
accused case Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović et al. excluded three killing sites.TPF102FPT 
The Prosecution had identified these three crimes sites as suitable candidates for a 
reduction at the Pre-Trial Conference. The Chamber held that “it is possible for the 
Chamber to determine the charges on which evidence should be led at trial by 
identifying those crime sites or incidents that are clearly different from the 
fundamental nature or theme of the case, and ordering the Prosecution to lead 
evidence relating to the other sites or incidents that fall squarely within that nature or 
theme.”TPF103FPT It rejected the argument of the Defence that the Prosecution was in the best 
position to identify the particular incidents which are representative in the case, and 
held that it had the power to identify itself the sites or incidents and determine their 
representativeness as required by Rule 73 bis (D).TPF104FPT 
On 31 August 2006, the Trial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Šešelj also invited 
the Prosecution to propose means of reducing the scope of the indictment by at least 
one-third by reducing the number of counts charged in the indictment and/or crime 
sites or incidents comprised in one or more charges in the indictment.TPF105FPT Likewise, on 
23 November 2006, the Trial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević 
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invited the Prosecution to reduce the scope of the indictment by at least one-third.TPF106FPT 
The Prosecution in the Šešelj case first “declined” the Chamber’s invitation claiming 
that a reduction of the indictment would result in a case which is not reasonably 
representative of the crimes charged, but eventually made a proposal of dropping 
counts and certain crime sites.  
Upon request by the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber also granted the admission of 
so-called “non-crime based evidence” that “contributes to proving charges beyond the 
limited scope of proving the occurrence of a crime or crimes within the 
geographically defined areas, even if it relates to a crime site for which no evidence 
relating to specific alleged crimes is to be presented”.TPF107FPT Such evidence seems not 
only difficult to determine, but could also have the potential of undermining the strict 
reduction of the scope of the indictment.  
 
7. Evidence  
 
7.1 Witness proofing – Banned under International Criminal Law ? 
 
In a remarkable decision of 8 November 2006, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber appears to 
have outlawed the practice commonly referred to as witness proofing. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber ordered the Prosecution in the case Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo not to 
undertake the practice of witness proofing and to refrain from any contact with the 
witness outside the courtroom from the moment the witness takes the stand and makes 
a solemn undertaking.TPF108FPT  
‘Witness proofing’ is a term used for a meeting between a party and its witness 
before giving testimony in court, during which the party familiarises its witness with 
the court proceedings and also refreshes the witness’ recollection as to the subject-
matter of the testimony in court by going through the witness statement(s) with the 
witness and also by comparing the witness statement(s) with the actual recollection of 
the witness and discussing possible discrepancies.  
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that the first component of a witness proofing – 
the familiarisation of the witness with the Trial lawyers and with the premises of the 
court and the court proceedings in general, the reassurance of the witness’ role in the 
court proceedings and of the legal obligations attached to it, as well as the inquiry 
whether protective measures are needed – was an admissible practice in proceedings 
before international criminal courts.TPF109FPT  
Unlike this more technical part of witness proofing, for which, according to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, the Victims and Witnesses Section rather than the Party is 
responsible,TPF110FPT witness proofing in the sense of a refreshment of the witness’ 
recollection, rehearsal, practise or coaching of witnesses is inadmissible. The Pre-
Trial Chamber held that such an interference with witnesses was not covered by any 
legal provisions applicable before the ICC. In particular, it observed that such a 
practice was unethical or unlawful in many national legal systems belonging to the 
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civil/continental law tradition. As far as common law countries are concerned, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber referred to the Code of Conduct of the Bar Council of England and 
Wales prohibiting rehearse practice and witness coaching.TPF111FPT 
The ICTY had the chance to take a position with regard to the ICC decision.TPF112FPT On 
15 November 2006, the Defence for General Ojdanić, relying on the ICC decision, 
requested to ban witness proofing in the case Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al.TPF113FPT In its 
response, the Prosecution strictly rejected the ICC decision and criticized the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for not having undertaken a careful and exhaustive review of the common 
law practices. TPF114FPT Although not specifically regulated, the international tribunals have 
not only tacitly accepted such practice, but the ICTY also approved it in a decision in 
Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj et al.TPF115FPT  
It was no surprise that, in its decision of 12 December 2006, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber denied the Defence motion and held that witness proofing is an acceptable 
and useful practice and does not per se prejudice the rights of the Accused as long as 
it does not cross into the territory of witness rehearsal and coaching.TPF116FPT It also rejected 
the ICC finding that “witness familiarisation” should be limited to the Victims and 
Witnesses Section.TPF117FPT  
The Chamber held that the ICC decision is not a binding authority for the ICTY 
since it is not based on a ”general renunciation of the practice of witness proofing”, 
but deals with a “radically different situation” of a pre-trial confirmation hearing.TPF118FPT It 
also noted that the sources of law the ICC and ICTY have resort to are different in 
that the ICTY is “not bound by national law” in “the present circumstances”.TPF119FPT  
The Chamber, however, acknowledged problems of late disclosure arising from a 
late witness proofing and requested the Prosecution to conduct proofing sessions at 
the earliest possible date.TPF120FPT  
 
8. Sentencing 
 
8.1. Maximum Sentence handed down by ICTY  
 
On 30 November 2006, the ICTY Appeals Chamber for the first time applied the 
maximum penalty pursuant to Rule 101 (A) of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. It sentenced Stanislav Galić, a former Bosnian-Serb Army Commander, to 
life imprisonment for his participation in the campaign of sniping and shelling of 
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Sarajevo between September 1992 and August 1994. The Appeals Chamber found 
that the primary purpose of these acts was to spread terror among the civilian 
population.TPF121FPT  
Unlike the ICTR,TPF122FPT the ICTY had not sentenced any accused to life imprisonment 
before. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stakić was an exception in this 
respect, but the life sentence was later reduced to imprisonment for a term of 40 years 
by the Appeals Chamber in the Appeal Judgment.TPF123FPT  
In the Galić Judgment, the Appeals Chamber increased the sentence the Trial 
Chamber had imposed on the Accused (20 years). The Trial Chamber had considered 
that Galić was only found guilty of crimes which formed part of a single campaign 
committed in a geographically limited territory over an uninterrupted period of 
time.TPF124FPT  
With respect to the single sentence, the Appeals Chamber found that, although the 
Trial Chamber did not err in its factual findings and correctly noted the principles 
governing sentencing, it failed to exercise its discretion properly because “the 
sentence of only 20 years was so unreasonable and plainly unjust, in that it 
underestimated the gravity of Galic's criminal conduct.”TPF125FPT  
 
8.2. Lowest Sentence handed down for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law by 
the ICTY 
 
The Orić Trial Chamber II sentenced the accused Naser Orić, a former senior 
commander of Bosnian-Muslim forces in and around Srebrenica, to no more than two 
years imprisonment.TPF126FPT This appears to be the lowest sentence ever handed down for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law by the ICTY. Orić was held 
responsible for not having prevented murder and cruel treatment of a number of Serb 
prisoners in 1992 and 1993 (superior responsibility). 
The Trial Chamber did not consider the superior position of the accused as an 
aggravating circumstance because it did “not reflect the real situation on the 
ground”.TPF127FPT Only the vulnerability of the victims who were all kept in detention was 
considered to be an aggravating circumstance.TPF128FPT On the other side, the Trial Chamber 
relied on a number of mitigating circumstances.TPF129FPT The predominant mitigating factor, 
however, was the ‘abysmal conditions’ in Srebrenica. The Chamber considered, inter 
alia, that the escalating offensive by militarily superior Serb forces, an unmanageable 
influx of refugees, the general chaos and collapse of law and order did not make it 
impossible for the accused to fulfil his duties, but “should have a strong mitigating 
effect”.TPF130FPT  
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